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FROM RIGHTS TO ARRANGEMENTS
Daniel R. Ortiz*
Election law is fast becoming a "discipline." No longer do we
see it as an ad hoc agglomeration of largely unconnected bits and
pieces of doctrine from other disciplines, like constitutional law. In-
deed, we now devote competing casebooks to it;' give it its own slot
in the curriculum; appoint experts in it to the faculties of major law
schools; and fund conferences where these same experts can regu-
larly applaud themselves and their many good works while fattening
their frequent flyer accounts. By any traditional measure, the field is
booming and needs no boosters. Even some good writing appears in
it.
So what, if anything, has this consolidation of election law ac-
complished? Has emancipating doctrinal categories like campaign
finance and reapportionment from the First Amendment and the
Equal Protection Clause and then lumping them together with each
other worked anything more than an aesthetic reconfiguration? Does
the servitude of these doctrines to a new discipline really change
them? If it does, does it change them for the better? Perhaps all our
professional effort has just exchanged one set of unhelpful discipli-
nary boundaries for another.
The rise of this discipline has made a difference-a profound
one, in fact. Consolidating the pieces has not just created a new fo-
rum in which to discuss the same old issues, but has changed the way
many of us look at those issues. By refocusing attention away from
some relationships to new ones, the development of election law as a
discipline has worked a great and helpful change. The purpose of
this brief symposium contribution is to suggest that this restructuring
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1. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1998); DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN,
ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1995).
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has improved analysis in two ways. First, it has broadened our un-
derstanding of how various electoral rules affect individual interests,
and second, it has led us away from a largely rights-based, individ-
ual-centered view of politics, to a more pragmatic and structural
view of politics as a matter of institutional arrangements. In the lat-
ter view, we analyze electoral rules, whether they concern redistrict-
ing, ballot access, or campaign finance, not only by how they directly
affect traditional individual rights, like free speech, but also by how
they affect the overall dynamic and health of our political system and
the relationships among its major players.
The difference is one of emphasis. The first view, a more tradi-
tional approach, focuses on the immediate-though possibly
oblique-effects of rules on long-recognized individual rights. The
second view focuses more on the rules' structural implications, on
how the rules advantage and disadvantage different types of institu-
tional players relative to each other, and how the rules change incen-
tives for various types of political behavior. Although a traditionalist
might complain that this new focus overlooks the primary role of the
individual in politics, an institutionalist would respond that it is the
structure that both enables and constrains individual political activ-
ity. Buckley v. Valeo,2 one of the central cases of the election law
canon, illustrates how individualism and institutionalism differ and
how institutionalism offers the fuller account of politics. Buckley
shows, if only by example, the kinds of changes disciplinary reor-
ganization can make.
After Watergate, Congress extensively amended the Federal
Election Campaign Act to regulate many forms of campaign spend-
ing, including individual contributions to and expenditures on behalf
of political candidates.4 In reviewing these particular provisions, the
Buckley Court developed the basic constitutional framework for
judging nearly all campaign finance reform. First, and most impor-
tantly, the Court located the dispute within existing conceptual and
doctrinal categories. Buckley was clearly a First Amendment case.
2. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
3. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1976) (amending Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 608 (Supp. IV 1970).
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Although the case raised associational issues, it centrally concerned
free speech:
The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate
in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment ac-
tivities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of
the system of government established by our Constitution.
The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to
such political expression in order "to assure [the] unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people." Although First
Amendment protections are not confined to "the exposition
of ideas," "there is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs, . . . of course in-
clud[ing] discussions of candidates" .... "[I]t can hardly
be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest
and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political office."5
The case fell not only within the ambit of the First Amendment,
but within the very core of its concern for political speech.
The Court was not just waving the flag. Campaign finance re-
strictions do implicate traditional speech interests. The reformers
admitted as much when they tried to distinguish Buckley as a special
kind of free speech case. They argued that Buckley, like United
States v. O'Brien,6 the draft card burning case, involved conduct
primarily and speech only incidentally.7 Their admission, however,
although perhaps necessary, gave up too much. By classifying the
case in terms of the First Amendment, the Court brought the whole
conceptual apparatus of free speech doctrine to bear on the issues-
whether it fit them or not. The case was framed almost exclusively
5. 424 U.S. at 14-15 (citations omitted) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948);
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); and Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,
401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
6. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
7. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-19.
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as involving a single type of participation right. Other interests were
left out.
Consider how moving campaign finance issues to a different
conceptual framework, like election law, changes things. Seeing
campaign finance issues through an election law lens still makes the
participation rights of political speakers an object of concern.
Speech about candidates and issues is, after all, an important part of
election law.8 This new lens, however, invites us to see speaking
rights as only one of several important interests. By highlighting
connections between campaign finance and issues of voter and can-
didate participation-such as poll taxes; one-person, one-vote; and
ballot access-this lens brings into focus several other issues that the
free speech framework largely ignores. To a small degree, of course,
these issues appear in the background of Buckley itself, but they are
barely visible.9 Seeing campaign finance as part of the new election
law discipline has the effect of bringing previously peripheral con-
cerns full front and center.'
0
First, this new approach encourages us to view campaign fi-
nance as implicating not just a narrow right of individual political
speech, but also a broader right of individual electoral participation.
The Court has rejected many formal and informal restrictions on who
can participate in elections, political party nominating events, 12 and
the even more informal processes leading up to party nominating
events.' 3 While the Court has never found a general right to vote in
8. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
9. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30-35 (discussing impact on incumbency rates
and minority parties).
10. This is not to say that Buckley would necessarily have come out differ-
ently under this new approach. The bottom line might have remained the
same. The reasoning, however, would have been much more responsive to the
full range of individual and institutional interests at stake.
11. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969)
(invalidating a New York statute that excluded from participation in school
district elections voters who neither owned real property within the school dis-
trict nor had children enrolled in the school district); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll tax).
12. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (invalidating white pri-
mary).
13. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (invalidating unofficial, pre-
party primary).
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the Constitution, it has found in equal protection a right not to be de-
nied the vote to the extent others have it.14 The Court has, for exam-
ple, struck down poll taxes under the fundamental rights strand of
equal protection because
[v]oter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to
paying or not paying this or any other tax ....
Wealth... is not germane to one's ability to participate in-
telligently in the electoral process.... To introduce wealth
or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications
is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.
15
Many reformers, of course, have pressed this connection.16 Just
as the state cannot condition the right to vote on payment of a fee, it
cannot, they argue, condition the right to speak on having a certain
amount of money. The Court would certainly strike down a state li-
censing fee for political speech. These reformers then stir in the
logic of the Court's right-to-appointed-counsel cases. Just as the
Court held that states could not allow market inequalities to make
certain differences in the criminal justice system, 7 the reformers ar-
gue that the state cannot allow some people's inferior position in the
economic market to place them at a severe disadvantage in the public
electoral process.
These reformers are right. If we locate campaign finance issues
within the fundamental rights strand of equal protection, we will
come close to placing an affirmative obligation on the state to main-
tain very rough equality among election speakers. Many will object,
of course, that campaign finance differs crucially both from requiring
a license to speak and from not providing an indigent criminal de-
fendant with a court-appointed attorney. In the first case, the state is
not passively relying on market inequalities but actively constructing
14. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
15. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666-68 (footnote omitted).
16. See Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and
Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1160 (1994); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the
Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 273 (1993).
17. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 16-19 (1956).
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a hurdle of its own. In the second, some might think the underlying
right needs more protection. The point here, however, is not to de-
cide which side is right, but only to show that shifting the lens
through which we view campaign finance from the right to free
speech to the right to participate highlights completely different is-
sues. It radically transforms the terms of the debate, but does not
necessarily settle it.
Second, we could see campaign finance issues as implicating
one-person, one-vote concerns. In the 1960s, the Supreme Court de-
cided that different election districts for the same class of political
office within a single political jurisdiction could not contain substan-
tially different numbers of people.' 8 Federal election districts, it later
held, had to achieve almost exact mathematical equality,' 9 while
state legislative and local districts were given somewhat more lee-
way. The Court reasoned that the Equal Protection Clause requires
each citizen to have an equal say in candidate elections. 21 Giving
one district of 200,000 people the same number of representatives as
a district of 100,000 people clearly violated this notion of political
equality.22
Reading campaign finance issues in light of these cases gives
campaign finance issues a new spin. The question becomes less
whether campaign finance regulation trenches on an individual's
right to speak and more whether allowing some people or entities to
spend more money on elections gives them more power over ulti-
mate political outcomes. Like the analogy to the right of participa-
tion cases, this approach stresses that spending implicates voting just
as much as speech. But, just as before, this shift in perspective may
deepen analysis without necessarily answering the bottom-line ques-
tion. One might believe that even if this type of inequality is bad,
correcting it would only worsen the problem.
This shift of perspective has much intuitive appeal, if only be-
cause the new perspective fits some of the experience it describes
18. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (state legislative dis-
tricts).
19. See Karcher v. Dagget 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1983).
20. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1973).
21. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-68.
22. See id. at 562-64.
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better than the old one. The free speech framework, for example,
explains only a small part of why people make contributions and in-
dependent expenditures. This framework views such spending more
as a way for the speaker to express ideas than as a way to get a can-
didate elected.23 This view leads the Court to distinguish contribu-
tions and independent expenditures from each other in an odd way.
Viewed in a purely expressive manner, contributions-money given
to a group to spend at its own discretion-represent second-rate
speech. They signal only the fact that a particular contributor likes a
particular candidate, but not what their shared ideas are or how
strongly the contributor likes the candidate.24 In other words, they
express a bond between the contributor and the candidate, yet reveal
almost nothing about that bond. Independent expenditures, on the
other hand, do communicate the speaker's own ideas because the
speaker controls how the money is spent.25 For this reason, they rep-
resent a kind of first-rate speech. The distinction between contribu-
tions and independent expenditures, the most troubling, often criti-
cized, but significant feature of the Court's reasoning in Buckley,
thus springs directly from the free speech lens the Court uses to see
the case. To the Court, independent expenditures deserve more pro-
tection than contributions not because they are more important to the
spender or to the candidate, but because their direct expressive con-
tent is richer.
This may be true, but it completely misses the point of why peo-
ple make contributions and independent expenditures. People pri-
marily spend money on candidates to help them win, not to ventilate
the contributors' own ideas. If the free speech view of spending
were really pertinent, for example, people would make expenditures
23. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-23.
24. As the Court put it:
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candi-
date and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for
the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does
not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the ex-
pression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contrib-
uting. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough in-
dex of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate.
Id. at 21.
25. See id. at 19-20.
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and seldom make contributions. Expenditures, after all, pack a much
greater direct expressive punch.26 But people typically make inde-
pendent expenditures only when they have "maxed out" on contribu-
tions, that is, made the maximum the law allows. And the reason is
clear. People want their candidates to win. When I contribute to
someone, I care less about whether the candidate expresses my own
ideas in the campaign than whether I can count on having the win-
ning candidate's vote in the legislature. Campaign speech is impor-
tant to me mostly insofar as it helps get my candidate elected. The
one-person, one-vote framework captures this insight nicely. If we
see spending more like voting-as a way of getting a candidate
elected, not as a way of better promoting the speaker's own thoughts
in the general marketplace of ideas-contributions and expenditures
make much more sense and it is easy to understand why people pre-
fer contributions over independent expenditures. Contributions are
simply a more effective way of getting a candidate elected. The can-
didate knows best how to spend to win.
Finally, we can view campaign finance in light of the ballot ac-
cess cases. In most of these cases, minor parties or independent can-
didates challenged rules that made it difficult for them to get a place
on the ballot.27 Although the Court has justified many of these laws
as necessary for an orderly election process 2 8 many commentators
have suggested a different motivation. They see these rules as ways
for the two existing major parties to keep out competition.29 By cre-
ating high barriers to entry, the two major parties can maintain du-
opoly power over the political process.
Although the courts have downplayed these kinds of concerns
in campaign finance, commentators on both sides of the debate
have seen obvious connections. Some deregulationists claim that
campaign finance regulation serves to entrench incumbents of both
26. See id.
27. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
28. See id. at 358; Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
29. See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme
Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans
from Political Competition, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 331; Samuel Issacharoff &
Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
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major parties.30 Reformers, on the other hand, argue that inadequate
regulation can entrench incumbents against challenge.3 The point
here is not to take sides in this debate, but to point out that the ballot
access framework puts these larger concerns that the free speech
framework overlooks full front and center.
The ballot access analogy also points to a different kind of
weakness in the free speech paradigm. Unlike the right to vote and
one-person, one-vote analogies, which brought into focus other indi-
vidual interests that the free speech paradigm ignored, the ballot ac-
cess analogy raises concerns that run beyond the individual. It points
to the larger institutional effects that various campaign finance re-
gimes can have. How does a particular regulatory regime affect the
competitiveness of non-incumbents? How does it affect the com-
petitiveness of minor parties and independent candidates? Just as
important, how does it affect the legislative process? Does it sys-
tematically advantage certain groups within the legislature? The
Court's traditional free speech focus deals awkwardly, if at all, with
these important concerns. It also causes us to overlook much of the
significance of political intermediaries, players like political action
committees, political parties, corporations, unions, and public inter-
est groups, all of which play important roles in our politics. The free
speech paradigm sees them primarily as ways of aggregating indi-
vidual expression, which misses the critical monitoring and disci-
plining functions these intermediaries perform.32
Interestingly, academics on both sides of the campaign finance
debate are more sensitive to these issues than are the courts. As the
field of election law develops, scholarly analysis seems to be moving
away from an almost exclusive focus upon individual speech, instead
focusing on other types of individual interests and on the larger
effects on institutional arrangements. Prominent deregulationists,
30. See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Argu-
ments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258 (1994); Bradley A.
Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign Fi-
nance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996).
31. See Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1400-03 (1994).
32, See BeVier, supra note 30, at 1276 (discussing monitoring role); Sam-
uel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing through Intermediaries, VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 1999) (discussing monitoring and disciplining functions).
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like Lillian BeVier and Bradley Smith, argue that campaign finance
regulation will have deleterious structural effects,33 while reformers
like Ronald Dworkin and Cass Sunstein talk about how campaign fi-
nance regulation can improve the structural arrangements of our po-
litical system.
34
Will the courts move from seeing campaign finance regulation
as an awkward step-child of the First Amendment to seeing it as im-
plicating the same kinds of individual and structural concerns that
other election law cases do? There is hope, but progress will be slow
and fitful. The old picture has a deep hold on us. We need nothing
less than a fundamental shakeup of current conceptual and doctrinal
categories. Still there is precedent. Consider the influence of law
and economics on private law. Although we still teach tort, contract,
and property in separate courses, in many law schools, concerns like
incentive effects, activity levels, and the Coase Theorem35 organize
them all. This thinking has gradually crept into the cases. Similarly,
many deep cultural assumptions have also crept into constitutional
doctrine despite the Constitution itself. The party system, for exam-
ple, appears nowhere in the Constitution and is, in fact, deeply anti-
thetical to the Framers' original beliefs.36 Yet the Court now sees it
as an institution worthy of particular constitutional respect.37 Doc-
trine will clearly lag behind, but we may hope that as election law
develops as a discipline, it will lead the courts, and the courts will
follow.
33. See BeVier, supra note 30, at 1267; Smith, supra note 30, at 1050.
34. See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1390-91; Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of
American Politics, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19.
35. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
36. See ISSACHAROFFETAL, supra note 1, at 187-89.
37. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
1226
